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Case Note
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa
Rica: Some Reflections on the Obligation to
Conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment
Yoshifumi Tanaka*
The Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa
Rica cases gave rise to important questions concern-
ing States’ procedural and substantive obligations
under international environment law, namely: the
obligation to conduct an environmental impact
assessment; the obligation to notify and consult; and
substantive obligations concerning transboundary
harm. The joint decision of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) provides interesting insights into the
interpretation of these obligations, especially that of
conducting an environmental impact assessment. In
particular, the ICJ has highlighted the interlinkage
between the obligations of due diligence, to conduct
an environmental impact assessment, and to notify
and consult; as well as the importance of scientific
evidence in the settlement of disputes concerning
environmental matters.
INTRODUCTION
Disputes between Costa Rica and Nicaragua derived
from activities of the two States in the San Juan River
area. On 18 November 2010, Costa Rica instituted pro-
ceedings against Nicaragua in the case concerning Cer-
tain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border
Area (hereafter Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) on the basis
of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota1 and Article 36.2
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).2 Subsequently, on 22 December 2011, Nicaragua
instituted proceedings against Costa Rica in the case
concerning Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along
the San Juan River (hereafterNicaragua v. Costa Rica)
on the basis of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota and
Article 36.2 of the ICJ Statute. By two separate orders
dated 17 April 2013, the ICJ joined the proceedings in
the two cases.3 It then delivered its judgment on 16
December 2015.4
The two cases considered a wide range of issues, such
as: (i) sovereignty over the disputed territory and
alleged breaches thereof; (ii) alleged violations of inter-
national environmental law; (iii) compliance with pro-
visional measures; (iv) rights of navigation; (v) alleged
breaches of treaty obligations; and (vi) reparation. This
case note examines the environmental issues that have
been ascertained by the ICJ in these two cases. The fol-
lowing section briefly outlines the course of the litiga-
tion. Next, the case note examines the obligation to
conduct an environmental impact assessment and to
notify and consult, respectively. It then addresses sub-
stantive obligations concerning transboundary harm,
before offering conclusions.
COURSE OF THE LITIGATION
The San Juan River runs approximately 205 kilometres
from Lake Nicaragua to the Caribbean Sea. At the point
known as ‘Delta Colorado’ or ‘Delta Costa Rica’, the
San Juan River divides into two branches: the Lower
San Juan and the Colorado River. The area situated
between the Colorado River and the Lower San Juan is
broadly referred to as Isla Calero, which is approxi-
mately 150 square kilometres. Isla Calero is part of the
Humedal Caribe Noreste (Northeast Caribbean Wet-
land) which was designated as a wetland of interna-
tional importance under the Ramsar Convention by
Costa Rica in 1996.5 The area immediately adjacent to
* Corresponding author.
Email: yoshifumi.tanaka@jur.ku.dk
1 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Bogota, 30 April 1948; in
force 6 May 1949).
2 Statute of the International Court of Justice (San Francisco, 26 June
1945; in force 24 October 1945) (‘ICJ Statute’).
3 Thereafter Judges Guillaume and Dugard sat as judges ad hoc in
the joined cases. ICJ 17 April 2013, Certain Activities carried out by
Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Joinder of
Proceedings.
4 ICJ 16 December 2015, Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua
in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) Construction of a Road
in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica),
[2015] ICJ Rep. A/71/4 (‘Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa
Rica’).
5 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar, 2
February 1971; in force 21 December 1975).
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it, known as the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Rıo San Juan
(San Juan River Wildlife Refuge), was designated by
Nicaragua as a wetland of international importance
under the Ramsar Convention in 2001. In accordance
with Article II of the 1858 Treaty of Limits, part of the
boundary between the two States runs along the right
(Costa Rican) bank of the San Juan River.6
On 18 October 2010, Nicaragua started dredging the
San Juan River in order to improve its navigability and
carried out works in the northern part of Isla Portillos,
while Costa Rica contended that Nicaragua artificially
created a channel on Costa Rican territory. Nicaragua
also sent some military units and other personnel to the
area. Nicaragua’s actions led Costa Rica to institute pro-
ceedings in the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua case.7 On the
other hand, in December 2010 Costa Rica started works
for the construction of a road, Route 1856 Juan Rafael
Mora Porras, which runs in Costa Rican territory along
part of its border with Nicaragua. Costa Rica main-
tained that a 2011 Executive Decree declaring a state of
emergency in the border area exempted it from the obli-
gation to conduct an environmental impact assessment
before constructing the road. In response, Nicaragua
instituted proceedings against Costa Rica.8
In its judgment of 16 December 2015, the ICJ found,
inter alia, that:9
• Costa Rica has sovereignty over the ‘disputed territory’;
• by excavating three ca~nos and establishing a mili-
tary presence on Costa Rican territory, Nicaragua
has violated the territorial sovereignty of Costa Rica;
• by excavating two ca~nos in 2013 and establishing a
military presence in the disputed territory, Nicar-
agua has breached the obligations incumbent upon it
under an ICJ order indicating provisional measures;
• Nicaragua has breached Costa Rica’s rights of navi-
gation on the San Juan River pursuant to the 1858
Treaty of Limits;
• Nicaragua has the obligation to compensate Costa
Rica for material damages caused by Nicaragua’s
unlawful activities on Costa Rican territory;10 and
• Costa Rica has violated its obligation under general
international law by failing to carry out an environ-
mental impact assessment concerning the construc-
tion of Route 1856.
The Court’s decision raises important questions con-
cerning procedural and substantive obligations in
international environment law, namely: the obliga-
tion to conduct an environmental impact assessment;
the obligation to notify and consult; and substantive
obligations concerning transboundary harm. The
next sections examine these three obligations in
turn.
PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS
OBLIGATION TO CONDUCT AN
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
One of the most important issues in the Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa Rica cases pertains
to the alleged breach of the obligation to carry out an
environmental impact assessment.11 While this issue
was discussed in the two cases, the ICJ reached differ-
ent conclusions.
In the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua case, Costa Rica claimed
that Nicaragua had not complied with an obligation to
conduct an environmental impact assessment and must
do so in advance of any further dredging.12 When exam-
ining this issue, the ICJ held that:
[T]o fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in prevent-
ing significant transboundary environmental harm, a State
must, before embarking on an activity having the potential
adversely to affect the environment of another State, ascer-
tain if there is a risk of significant transboundary harm,
which would trigger the requirement to carry out an
environmental impact assessment.13
The Court thus ascertained whether Nicaragua’s dredg-
ing activities in the Lower San Juan carried a risk of sig-
nificant transboundary harm. In this regard, the Court
noted that in 2006, Nicaragua conducted an environ-
mental impact study. The study stated that the pro-
gramme would not have a significant impact on the flow
of the Colorado River. This conclusion was confirmed
by both parties’ experts. After the examination of the
evidence, including the reports submitted and testi-
mony given by experts called by both parties, the Court
found that Nicaragua’s dredging programme was not
such as to give rise to a risk of significant transboundary
harm, either with respect to the flow of the Colorado
River or to Costa Rica’s wetland. It thus concluded that
6 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraphs 56–59.
7 Ibid., at paragraph 63.
8 Ibid., at paragraph 64.
9 Ibid., at paragraph 229.
10 Related to this, the ICJ decided that failing agreement between the
parties on this matter within 12 months from the date of this judgment,
the question of compensation due to Costa Rica will, at the request of
one of the parties, be settled by the Court. Ibid., at paragraph 229.5
(b).
11 For a detailed study on environmental impact assessment, see N.
Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment:
Process, Substance and Integration (Cambridge University Press,
2008).
12 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 102. See also Memorial of Costa Rica in Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua (Vol. I, 5 December 2011), 105, at paragraphs 3.74–3.75.
13 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 104.
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Nicaragua was not required to carry out an environ-
mental impact assessment.14
In the Nicaragua v. Costa Rica case, Nicaragua alleged
that Costa Rica breached its obligation under general
international law to assess the environmental impact of
the construction of the road before commencing it, par-
ticularly in view of the road’s length and location.15 It
also submitted that Costa Rica was required to carry
out an environmental impact assessment under Article
14 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).16
In this regard, the Court recalled that a State’s obliga-
tion to exercise due diligence in preventing significant
transboundary harm requires that State to ascertain
whether there is a risk of significant transboundary
harm prior to undertaking an activity having the poten-
tial adversely to affect the environment of another
State. If that is the case, the State concerned must con-
duct an environmental impact assessment. According
to the Court, however, Costa Rica did not adduce any
evidence that it actually carried out a preliminary
assessment of the risks posed by the road project.17 Fur-
thermore, the Court found that the construction of the
road by Costa Rica carried a risk of significant trans-
boundary harm. It thus concluded that the threshold
for triggering the obligation to evaluate the environ-
mental impact of the road project was met.18 Moreover,
the Court considered that there was no emergency justi-
fying the immediate construction of the road. As a con-
sequence, Costa Rica was under an obligation to
conduct an environmental impact assessment prior to
commencement of the construction works.19 Citing its
judgment in the Pulp Mills case,20 the Court stressed
that ‘the obligation to conduct an environmental impact
assessment requires an ex ante evaluation of the risk of
significant transboundary harm, and thus “an environ-
mental impact assessment must be conducted prior to
the implementation of a project”’.21
Costa Rica’s environmental diagnostic assessment and
its other studies were post hoc assessments of the envir-
onmental impact of the stretches of the road that had
already been built. These studies did not evaluate the
risk of future harm.22 The Court thus concluded that
Costa Rica had not complied with its obligation under
general international law to carry out an environmental
impact assessment concerning the construction of the
road.23 Furthermore, according to the Court, Costa Rica
remains under an obligation to prepare an appropriate
environmental impact assessment for any further works
on the road or in the area adjoining the San Juan River,
should they carry a risk of significant transboundary
harm.24 On the other hand, the Court took the view
that, since Article 14 of the CBD does not create an obli-
gation to carry out an environmental impact assess-
ment before undertaking an activity that may have
significant adverse effects on biological diversity, Costa
Rica had not breached that provision by failing to con-
duct an environmental impact assessment for its road
project.25
Two issues arise with regard to the ICJ’s view on the
obligation to conduct an environmental impact assess-
ment. The first issue concerns the relationship between
the obligation of due diligence and the obligation to
carry out an environmental impact assessment. It
appears that the Court linked the obligation to conduct
an environmental impact assessment to the obligation
of due diligence via preliminary assessment to ascertain
the existence of risk of significant transboundary harm.
The interlinkage between the two obligations was
already clearly stated in the Pulp Mills judgment. In the
words of the Court,
[D]ue diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention
which it implies, would not be considered to have been exer-
cised, if a party planning works liable to affect the regime of
the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an
environmental impact assessment on the potential effects of
such works.26
The Court’s view was amplified by Judge Owada:
To summarize, conducting an environmental impact assess-
ment is one important constituent element of the process
that emanates from the international obligation of States to
act in due diligence to avoid or mitigate significant trans-
boundary harm, rather than a separate and independent
obligation standing on its own under general international
law.27
The Court’s interpretation thus contributes to specify-
ing the content of the obligation of due diligence by
combining it with the obligation to conduct an environ-
mental impact assessment. Yet, the Court did not exam-
ine any State practice and opinio juris in support of its
interpretation. Therefore, some doubt could be
expressed on whether the Court’s interpretation is
14 Ibid., at paragraph 105.
15 Ibid., at paragraph 146. See also Memorial of Nicaragua in Nicar-
agua v. Costa Rica (Vol. I, 19 December 2012), 152, at paragraph 5.6ff.
16 Ibid., 195–197, at paragraphs 5.71–5.72. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/
Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at paragraph 163.
17 Ibid., at paragraph 153.
18 Ibid., at paragraphs 155–156.
19 Ibid., at paragraphs 157–159.
20 ICJ 20 April 2010, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.
Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep. 14 (‘Pulp Mills’).
21 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 161.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., at paragraph 162.
24 Ibid., at paragraph 173.
25 Ibid., at paragraphs 163–164.
26 Pulp Mills, n. 20 above, at paragraph 204.
27 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above,
Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, at paragraph 18. See also at para-
graph 21.
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supported by State practice.28 Traditionally the obliga-
tion of due diligence is closely linked to State responsi-
bility for damage that has been caused already, in the
sense that the alleged breach of that obligation occurs
after environmental damage has arisen.29 However, an
environmental impact assessment aims to detect a risk
of significant environmental harm that is likely to be
created in the future. The obligation to conduct an
environmental impact assessment therefore can be
breached, even if no environmental damage has been
caused yet. In this sense, the function of the obligation
to conduct an environmental impact assessment differs
from that of the obligation of due diligence. In fact,
Judge ad hoc Dugard took the view that the obligation
to conduct an environmental impact assessment is an
independent obligation designed to prevent significant
transboundary harm, not an obligation dependent on
the obligation of a State to exercise due diligence.30
The second issue raised by the judgment relates to the
content of an environmental impact assessment. In this
regard, the Court in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua simply
stated that: ‘Determination of the content of the envir-
onmental impact assessment should be made in light of
the specific circumstances of each case.’31 The Pulp
Mills judgment amplified this point, stating that:
[I]t is the view of the Court that it is for each State to deter-
mine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization pro-
cess for the project, the specific content of the
environmental impact assessment required in each case,
having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed
development and its likely adverse impact on the environ-
ment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in con-
ducting such an assessment.32
The dictum of the Court appears to suggest that the
environmental impact assessment obligation has no
independent content and that there is simply a renvoi
to municipal law.33 On the basis of the Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua judgment, however, it seems possible to
identify a series of requirements concerning environ-
mental impact assessment under international law,
including:34
(i) an environmental impact assessment must be
undertaken prior to the implementation of the
activity in question;35
(ii) a preliminary assessment must be made on the
basis of an objective evaluation of all the relevant
circumstances;36
(iii) an environmental impact assessment must be
done by the State undertaking the activity;37
(iv) if an environmental impact assessment confirms
that there is a risk of significant transboundary
harm, the State planning to undertake the activity
is required to notify and consult in good faith with
the potentially affected State, where that is neces-
sary to determine the appropriate measures to
prevent or mitigate that risk.38
These elements potentially provide criteria for deter-
mining the alleged breach of the obligation to conduct
an environmental impact assessment in international
law.
At the same time, it cannot pass unnoticed that the obli-
gation to carry out an environmental impact assess-
ment contains potential weaknesses. Two points can be
made here.
First, an environmental impact assessment will be ad-
equate if it provides the necessary information concern-
ing the likely transboundary impact deriving from the
proposed project and follows the proper process.39 Thus,
an environmental impact assessment does not, by itself,
determine whether and how a project should go ahead.
Second, according to the ICJ, a State is required to con-
duct a dual assessment. At first, the State is obliged to
ascertain whether there is a risk of significant trans-
boundary harm that would trigger the duty to conduct
an environmental impact assessment (preliminary
assessment). Only if such a risk exists, the State is fur-
ther required to carry out an environmental impact
assessment. However, the evidential standard for deter-
mining ‘significant’ transboundary harm is less clear
and it is a matter of subjective appreciation. As a conse-
quence, there is no guarantee that the obligation to con-
duct an environmental impact assessment is
appropriately triggered by the State causing the risk. In
this regard, the application of the precautionary
approach merits attention.40 Yet, there was no
28 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above,
Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, at paragraph 9; Costa Rica
v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, Separate Opinion
of Judge Donoghue, at paragraph 13.
29 Y. Matsui, International Law of the Environment: Its Fundamental
Principles (Toshindo, 2010), 108 (in Japanese).
30 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, n. 28 above, at para-
graph 9.
31 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 104.
32 Pulp Mills, n. 20 above, at paragraph 205.
33 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, n. 28 above, at para-
graph 18; Separate Opinion of Judge Donoghue, n. 28 above, at para-
graph 15.
34 Judge ad hoc Dugard attempted to clarify these elements in his
Separate Opinion. Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, n. 28
above, at paragraph 19.
35 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 161. See also Pulp Mills, n. 20 above, at paragraph 205.
36 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 153.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., at paragraph 104.
39 Alan Boyle, ‘Developments in the International Law of Environmen-
tal Impact Assessments and their Relation to the Espoo Convention’,
20:3 Review of European Community and International Environmental
Law (2011), 229.
40 P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the
Environment (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 171.
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reference to the precautionary approach in the Court’s
judgment.
OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY
Another procedural issue to be examined relates to the
obligation to notify. Notably, the Court linked the obli-
gation to notify with the obligation to conduct an envir-
onmental impact assessment, stating that:
If the environmental impact assessment confirms that there
is a risk of significant transboundary harm, the State plan-
ning to undertake the activity is required, in conformity with
its due diligence obligation, to notify and consult in good
faith with the potentially affected State, where that is neces-
sary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or
mitigate that risk.41
In fact, the Court, in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, ruled
that since Nicaragua was not under an international
obligation to carry out an environmental impact assess-
ment in light of the absence of risk of significant trans-
boundary harm, it was not required to notify or consult
with Costa Rica. In Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, the Court
held that since Costa Rica did not comply with its obli-
gation under general international law to perform an
environmental impact assessment prior to the construc-
tion of the road, the duty to notify and consult did not
call for examination by the Court.42 At the same time,
the Court ruled that, if the circumstances so require,
Costa Rica would have to consult in good faith with
Nicaragua to determine the appropriate measures to
prevent significant transboundary harm or minimize
the risk thereof.43
The Court’s formulation could be read in a way to sug-
gest that only when an environmental impact assess-
ment confirms that there is a risk of significant
transboundary harm, the State causing the risk must
notify potentially affected State(s). As Judge Donoghue
pointedly observed, however, there may be other cir-
cumstances that call for notification. For instance,
assessment of a risk of transboundary environmental
harm necessitates cooperation between the State caus-
ing the risk and potentially affected State(s). Input from
a potentially affected State may be needed when assess-
ing such a risk.44 In this case, there will be a need for
the State causing the risk to notify and consult in good
faith with potentially affected State(s). Hence, there
appears to be some scope to consider whether the obli-
gation to notify is triggered only when an environmen-
tal impact assessment finds a risk of significant
transboundary environmental harm. In this regard, the
Court did not examine State practice and opinio juris in
support of its formulation of the obligation of notifica-
tion.45 Thus, the legal basis for this particular formula-
tion remains unclear.
A further issue concerns the question whether the par-
ties to the dispute had breached obligations under
Articles 3.2 and 5 of the Ramsar Convention. In the
view of the Court, the obligation to notify set out in Arti-
cle 3.2 is limited to notifying the Ramsar Secretariat of
changes or likely changes in the ‘ecological character of
any wetland’ in the territory of the notifying State. In
this regard, the Court found that no obligation to
inform the Ramsar Secretariat arose for Nicaragua,
since no evidence before the Court indicated that Nicar-
agua’s dredging programme had brought about any
changes in the ecological character of the wetland.46
Likewise, the Court ruled that Costa Rica has not brea-
ched Article 3.2 of the Ramsar Convention since it noti-
fied the Ramsar Secretariat about the stretch of the
road that passes through the Humedal Caribe Nor-
este.47
Article 5 of the Ramsar Convention provides a general
obligation for parties to consult about implementing
obligations arising from the Convention. This provision
deserves quoting in full:
The Contracting Parties shall consult with each other about
implementing obligations arising from the Convention espe-
cially in the case of a wetland extending over the territories
of more than one Contracting Party or where a water system
is shared by Contracting Parties. They shall at the same time
endeavour to coordinate and support present and future
policies and regulations concerning the conservation of wet-
lands and their flora and fauna.
The Court considered that this provision does not create
an obligation on Nicaragua to consult with Costa Rica
concerning a particular project, namely, the dredging of
the Lower San Juan River.48 The Court thus concluded
that it had not been established that Nicaragua brea-
ched any procedural obligations owed to Costa Rica
under treaties or the customary international law of the
environment.49
However, Judge ad hoc Dugard dissented with the
Court’s finding, arguing: ‘When read in conjunction
with Article 3(1), Nicaragua was obliged to consult with
Costa Rica on the promotion of conservation in both its
own wetland and that of Costa Rica in its planning of
activities affecting the wetlands.’50 Indeed, there may
41 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 104.
42 Ibid., at paragraph 168.
43 Ibid., at paragraph 173.
44 Ibid., at paragraphs 21–24.
45 Separate Opinion of Judge Donoghue, n. 28 above, at paragraphs
17–18.
46 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 109.
47 Ibid., at paragraph 172.
48 Ibid., at paragraph 110.
49 Ibid., at paragraph 112.
50 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, n. 28 above, at para-
graph 44.
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be some scope to argue that a water system is shared by
Costa Rica and Nicaragua in relation to Northeast
Caribbean Wetland. If this is the case, shared responsi-
bility may arise with regard to the conservation of the
wetland concerned.51 Hence, there appears to be some
basis to reconsider the question of whether Nicaragua is
obliged to consult with Costa Rica about implementing
obligations under the Ramsar Convention in relation to
Northeast CaribbeanWetland.52
SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS
CONCERNING TRANSBOUNDARY
HARM
The substantive issue to be examined in Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa Rica is whether
Nicaragua is responsible for any transboundary harm
allegedly caused by its dredging activities that have
taken place in areas under Nicaragua’s territorial sover-
eignty, in the Lower San Juan River and on its left bank.
Here the Court confirmed the dictum of the Pulp Mills
judgment that under customary international law, ‘[a]
State is . . . obliged to use all the means at its disposal in
order to avoid activities which take place in its territory,
or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant
damage to the environment of another State’.53 How-
ever, the Court considered that Costa Rica had not pro-
vided any convincing evidence that sediments dredged
from the river were deposited on its right bank and that
a causal link between this reduction and Nicaragua’s
dredging programme has not been established.54 It thus
concluded that Nicaragua has not breached its obliga-
tions by engaging in dredging activities in the Lower
San Juan River.55
In the Nicaragua v. Costa Rica case, the key issue was
whether the construction of the road by Costa Rica had
caused significant harm to Nicaragua. In considering
this issue, scientific evidence is of central importance.
Yet, there was considerable disagreement amongst the
experts on key data on this matter. In this regard, the
Court took the position that there was no need to go
into a detailed examination of the scientific and tech-
nical validity of the different estimates put forward by
the experts. According to the Court, ‘[s]uffice it to note
that the amount of sediment in the river due to the
construction of the road represents at most 2 per cent
of the river’s total load, according to Costa Rica’s calcu-
lations based on the figures provided by Nicaragua’s
experts and uncontested by the latter’.56 In the Nicar-
agua v. Costa Rica case, the figure of 2% provided a
key criterion to determine: (i) alleged harm caused by
increased sedimentation concentrations in the river;
and (ii) alleged harm to the river’s morphology, to
navigation and to Nicaragua’s dredging programme. In
this regard, the Court held that Nicaragua failed to
prove that sediment concentration arising from the
construction of the road caused significant trans-
boundary harm to the San Juan River.57 It also ruled
that Nicaragua failed to prove that the construction of
the road caused significant harm to the river’s ecosys-
tem and water quality.58
In determining substantive obligations concerning
transboundary harm, there is a need to ascertain scien-
tific evidence submitted by the parties. Arguably, this is
a challenging task for the ICJ since the disputing parties
often submit contrasting data on environmental harm.
Some doubts could be expressed on whether the Court
is well placed to deal with competing scientific evi-
dence.59 A possible solution to this matter could be to
entrust an expert to evaluate scientific evidence in
accordance with Article 50 of the ICJ Statute, which
provides that: ‘The Court may, at any time, entrust any
individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organ-
ization that it may select, with the task of carrying out
an enquiry or giving an expert opinion.’60
In practice, however, it is rare for the Court to invoke its
power under this provision.61 In the Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa Rica cases, the
Court ascertained competing scientific evidence on its
own, without appointing a scientific expert. However,
there may be some scope to consider the question
whether the evaluation of scientific evidence by the
Court itself is always relevant when determining the
‘significant’ environmental harm since the degree of
‘significant’ harm must be determined on the basis
of scientific standard.62 To enhance the persuasiveness
51 Related to this, it is to be noted that the obligations which the parties
to the Ramsar Convention undertake regarding conservation of listed
sites are not restricted to those within their own territory. M. Bowman,
P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law, 2nd
edn (Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 424.
52 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, n. 28 above, at para-
graph 44.
53 Ibid., at paragraph 118. See also Pulp Mills, n. 20 above, at para-
graph 101.
54 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua/Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, n. 4 above, at
paragraph 119.
55 Ibid., at paragraph 120.
56 Ibid., at paragraph 186.
57 Ibid., at paragraphs 194–196 and 203–207.
58 Ibid., at paragraphs 211–213.
59 A. Riddell and B. Plant, Evidence before the International Court of
Justice (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2009),
at 353.
60 ICJ Statute, n. 2 above, Article 50.
61 In the Corfu Channel case, the Court appointed experts since it was
necessary to obtain an expert opinion with regard to certain points
contested between the Parties. ICJ 17 December 1948, Corfu Chan-
nel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania),
ICJ Rep. 1948, 124. Recently, it appointed experts in a case concern-
ing maritime delimitation. ICJ 16 June 2016, Maritime Delimitation in
the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
not yet reported.
62 Pulp Mills, n. 20 above, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Simma
and Al-Khazawneh, at paragraph 17.
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of the ICJ’s judgments concerning environmental dis-
putes, the use of appointed experts deserves serious
consideration.63
CONCLUSIONS
In the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa
Rica cases, the ICJ examined procedural obligations
under international environmental law in some detail.
It is noteworthy that the Court highlighted the inter-
linkage between three obligations, namely, those of due
diligence, to conduct an environmental impact assess-
ment, and to notify and consult. However, further con-
sideration should be given to the question of whether
the obligation to notify is triggered only when an envir-
onmental impact assessment finds a risk of significant
transboundary environmental harm. The Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Costa Rica cases also
highlighted the importance of scientific evidence in the
settlement of disputes concerning environmental pro-
tection, including the protection of biological diversity.
More often than not, it is difficult for the Court as a
judicial organ to evaluate competing scientific evidence.
In future, the use of scientific experts under Article 50
of the ICJ Statues is worth considering in the settlement
of disputes involving scientific and technical aspects.
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